8 posts
Forever caught live malware on a customer's machine attempting a new kind of attack: a file planted in the Downloads folder that turns your own AI coding agent against you. Here's how it works on Codex and Claude Code, and why the vector stays open.
OpenCode says attackers reached AI provider keys stored in 1.4% of OpenCode Console workspaces. How to tell if you are affected, what to rotate, and what is still unknown. Updated as the incident develops.
Breaking down a newly discovered prompt attack technique that isn't prompt injection.
We hijacked the agents inside Gemini Live in Chrome, Microsoft Edge, Opera Neon, Perplexity Comet, and Claude in Chrome - using one single extension
BragJack attack (discovered by Forever Security) allowed ordinary extensions to hijack the internal browser agent of Comet, Chrome, Edge, Opera, and Claude in Chrome
How SiderAI and MaxAI agentic side panel extensions are vulnerable to severe cross-site vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to compromise browsers easily and entirely
How MaxiAI Chrome extension vulnerability allows arbitrary websites access extension-level permissions, leading to UXSS, arbitrary local file read (potentially), universal screenshooting, and more
How SiderAI Chrome extension vulnerability allowed arbitrary websites to hiddenly embed other websites and trigger typing/clicking gestures within them, effectively allowing UXSG (Universal Cross Site Gesturing)
